← Back to News

Glass Warehouse, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

The Tax Court’s November 2, 2026 ruling in Glass Warehouse, LLC v. C. Memo. 2026-111) stripped the closely held corporation of a $118,302 deduction for subcontractor payments in 2019 and imposed a $13,471 accuracy-related penalty for 2018 due to inadequate recordkeeping.

Case: 23707-22
Court: US Tax Court
Opinion Date: November 11, 2026
Published: Nov 11, 2026
TAX_COURT

The $118,302 Mistake: How Poor Recordkeeping Cost Glass Warehouse

The Tax Court’s November 2, 2026 ruling in Glass Warehouse, LLC v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo. 2026-111) stripped the closely held corporation of a $118,302 deduction for subcontractor payments in 2019 and imposed a $13,471 accuracy-related penalty for 2018 due to inadequate recordkeeping. The case highlights a critical lesson: the Tax Court enforces strict substantiation rules, rejecting arguments that informal invoices or bank records suffice under Section 6001. The ruling also clarifies that relying solely on a CPA’s advice does not protect against penalties when the underlying deduction lacks proper documentation. For closely held corporations, the decision underscores a stark reality: compensation structures must comply with IRS substantiation standards, or deductions—and even penalties—will follow.

A Tale of Two Compensation Structures: W-2 Wages vs. Subcontractor Fees

Glass Warehouse, a San Diego-based C corporation, operated a $4.1 million business in 2019 selling glass shower doors and enclosures through third-party retail platforms like Home Depot, Wayfair, and Houzz. The company’s two shareholder-officers—Ryan Thatcher (80% owner) and Nidal Hanna (20% owner)—managed all operations, including sales, inventory purchasing, employee oversight, and customer retention. Both worked full time, with Thatcher serving as president and Hanna as vice president, and the company employed approximately ten additional staff members.

The compensation structure for Thatcher and Hanna was bifurcated: they received both W-2 wages and subcontractor fees. For 2019, Glass Warehouse issued W-2 wages totaling $92,712 to Thatcher and $73,962 to Hanna. Concurrently, the company claimed a deduction for $173,974 in subcontractor fees, including $98,774 paid to Thatcher and $11,045 paid to Hanna. Notably, Glass Warehouse did not issue Forms 1099 to either shareholder-officer for these payments. Instead, Thatcher and Hanna reported the $109,819 in subcontractor fees as “Other income” on their joint federal return, while also including the $166,674 in W-2 wages from Glass Warehouse.

The lack of substantiation extended beyond missing Forms 1099. Mallory Copeland, Glass Warehouse’s accounting manager, testified that the company did not maintain any subcontractor agreements or documentation specifying the services rendered by Thatcher and Hanna in their alleged subcontractor roles. The absence of contemporaneous records—such as invoices, contracts, or third-party confirmations—raised immediate red flags under Section 6001, which requires taxpayers to maintain “sufficient records” to support deductions. On August 18, 2022, the IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency disallowing $118,302 of the claimed $173,974 subcontractor-expense deduction, citing a failure to substantiate the payments under Section 162, which permits deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses only when adequately documented. The IRS’s position hinged on the lack of verifiable evidence that the payments to Thatcher and Hanna were for legitimate services rather than disguised compensation for their roles as shareholder-officers.

The Battle Lines: Petitioner vs. IRS on Substantiation and Intent

The IRS’s disallowance of $118,302 in subcontractor-expense deductions for 2019 hinged on a single, unassailable premise: no verifiable evidence existed to prove the payments to shareholder-officers Thatcher and Hanna were for legitimate services rather than disguised compensation. The dispute crystallized into a clash over substantiation and intent—two pillars of deductibility under Section 162, which permits deductions for "ordinary and necessary" business expenses only when adequately documented.

Glass Warehouse, the petitioner, mounted a three-pronged defense centered on credibility and context. First, the company relied on the sworn testimony of Ms. Copeland, a shareholder-officer, who described the day-to-day operational duties of Thatcher and Hanna—arguing that their roles extended beyond typical corporate governance into hands-on management of the warehouse’s logistics, inventory, and client relations. Second, Glass Warehouse contended that the $173,974 in payments to Thatcher ($98,774) and Hanna ($75,200) were not disguised dividends but legitimate compensation for additional services rendered beyond their W-2 wages. Third, the company pointed to the inclusion of these payments as "Other income" on the shareholders’ joint return, asserting that this reporting demonstrated their bona fide nature as business-related income.

The IRS, however, dismissed these arguments as circular and unsupported. The agency emphasized that no contemporaneous records—no contracts, invoices, timesheets, or Forms 1099—existed to substantiate the payments under Section 6001, which requires taxpayers to maintain sufficient records to verify deductions. The IRS further argued that the payments were recharacterized as disguised dividends based on the company’s own "Shareholder Distributions" spreadsheet, which reclassified distributions to Thatcher and Hanna as subcontractor fees. This internal inconsistency, the IRS contended, undermined Glass Warehouse’s claim of compensatory intent. The agency also noted that the payments were disproportionate to the shareholders’ stated roles, suggesting they were returns on equity rather than payments for services rendered.

The battle lines were drawn: Glass Warehouse’s case rested on oral testimony and circumstantial evidence, while the IRS demanded documentary proof—a standard the court would later deem non-negotiable. The stakes were clear: if the court sided with the IRS, the $118,302 disallowance would stand, along with potential penalties for substantial understatement under Section 6662(a). If Glass Warehouse prevailed, the deduction would be reinstated, but only if the court accepted that intent and credibility could substitute for formal substantiation—a proposition the IRS vehemently opposed.

The Court's Verdict: Substantiation Trumps Flexibility

The Tax Court, in Glass Warehouse, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-5 (Judge Lauber, filed Nov. 2, 2026), delivered a blunt rebuke to the petitioner’s attempt to deduct $109,819 in subcontractor fees paid to its two shareholder-officers, Mark Thatcher and Sarah Hanna, for 2019. The court held that the corporation had failed to meet its burden of proof under Rule 142(a) and § 7491(a), which shift the burden to the taxpayer to substantiate deductions. The IRS had disallowed the deduction in full, and the court agreed, finding that the petitioner’s reliance on Ms. Copeland’s vague testimony and shareholder tax reporting was insufficient to overcome the strict substantiation requirements of § 162(a) and § 6001.

The court’s reasoning hinged on three foundational legal principles, each of which the petitioner could not satisfy. First, the court reiterated that deductions are a matter of legislative grace, not an inherent right. As the court noted, citing New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 415, 440 (1934), "the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show entitlement to a deduction." Second, the court applied the two-prong test for deductibility under § 162(a)(1): the expense must be (1) ordinary and necessary and (2) paid with compensatory intent. Third, the court emphasized that § 6001 requires taxpayers to maintain sufficient records to substantiate deductions, and that oral testimony alone cannot substitute for documentary proof.

The petitioner’s failure to present any contracts, invoices, Forms 1099, or payroll records for the payments to Thatcher and Hanna proved fatal. Ms. Copeland, the corporation’s sole witness, testified that Thatcher and Hanna performed "day-to-day operational duties" such as managing customers, inventory, and employees, but she could not identify any specific subcontractor services they provided beyond these roles. The court found her testimony "vague and unhelpful," noting that it did not establish the nature, amount, or purpose of the payments. The court further observed that the petitioner had issued Forms 1099 to other workers when it knew the nature of their services, yet failed to do so for Thatcher and Hanna. The absence of any documentary evidence left the court with no basis to infer that the payments were for subcontractor services rather than disguised dividends.

The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the shareholders’ personal tax reporting of the $109,819 as "Other income" on their joint return substantiated the corporation’s deduction. The court held that "a corporation is generally recognized as a tax entity separate from its shareholders," citing Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438–39 (1943), and that "the shareholders’ tax position has no bearing on whether the corporation may deduct the expense." The court also dismissed the petitioner’s contention that the payments were a case of worker misclassification, noting that § 3509—which imposes penalties for misclassifying employees as independent contractors—does not convert non-deductible contractor expenses into deductible wages. The court held that the petitioner did not offer any evidence that it had misclassified Thatcher or Hanna, and thus the argument was irrelevant to the deduction issue.

Most critically, the court refused to infer compensatory intent from the lack of substantiation. The petitioner argued that Thatcher and Hanna’s personal tax reporting demonstrated that the payments were intended as compensation, but the court held that "how a shareholder reports an item on a personal tax return does not control how the corporation reports that same item on its own tax return." The court further noted that neither Thatcher nor Hanna testified, and that the petitioner presented no evidence of an agreement—written or oral—under which the payments were for services beyond their regular duties. The court concluded that "the record does not contain any documents or any testimony showing that such an arrangement existed." Because the petitioner failed to substantiate the payments under § 162(a)(1), the court held that it need not decide the parties’ competing arguments about compensatory intent, disguised dividends, or the significance of the bookkeeping entries in Exhibits 1005-R and 1006-R.

The court’s strict adherence to substantiation requirements underscored its reluctance to infer intent or credibility without documentary proof. The opinion emphasized that flexibility in compensation structures does not excuse non-compliance with substantiation rules. The ruling sends a strong signal to closely held corporations: oral testimony and informal arrangements will not suffice when the IRS challenges deductions. The court’s power to disallow deductions entirely for lack of substantiation—even where compensatory intent is plausible—demonstrates its willingness to exercise authority over deficiency determinations when taxpayers fail to meet evidentiary burdens.

The $13,471 Penalty: When Reliance on a CPA Isn't Enough

The Tax Court’s ruling in Glass Warehouse, Inc. v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo. 2026-11, filed October 16, 2025) delivers a blunt warning to closely held corporations: hiring a CPA does not shield a taxpayer from penalties when the IRS challenges a return position. The court imposed a $13,471 accuracy-related penalty under Section 6662(a) for tax year 2018, rejecting the corporation’s argument that it had reasonably relied on its paid preparer, Ahuja & Clark. The decision underscores the Tax Court’s willingness to exercise its authority over the IRS’s deficiency determinations—not by second-guessing the IRS’s substantive tax positions, but by rigorously enforcing the taxpayer’s burden of proof when penalties are at issue.

The penalty arose from a $107,775 understatement of tax—an amount exceeding the 10% threshold for a "substantial understatement" under Section 6662(d)(1)(B), which defines a substantial understatement for corporations as one exceeding the lesser of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or $10,000. The court held that the understatement was substantial because it exceeded 10% of the $107,775 tax required to be shown on Glass Warehouse’s 2018 Form 1120. The IRS also asserted the penalty on the alternative ground of negligence or disregard of rules and regulations under Section 6662(b)(1), but the court did not need to address this second theory because the substantial understatement penalty alone sufficed.

The burden of proof for the penalty fell squarely on Glass Warehouse. Unlike individuals, corporations do not benefit from Section 7491(c), which shifts the burden of production to the IRS for accuracy-related penalties. The court cited NT, Inc. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 191, 195 (2006), noting that Section 7491(c) by its terms does not apply to corporations. Thus, Glass Warehouse had to prove either that the IRS’s penalty determination was incorrect or that it qualified for an affirmative defense, such as reasonable cause and good faith under Section 6664(c).

The court rejected Glass Warehouse’s argument that it had reasonably relied on its CPA. The corporation’s brief contained only vague assertions—that it "reasonably relied on a qualified professional tax adviser" and that "there is no evidence of negligence, disregard of rules, or intent to understate tax." But the Tax Court does not accept briefs as evidence. Rule 143(c) explicitly states that "statements in briefs . . . do not constitute evidence," and the court cited Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 214 n.7 (1992), for the same principle.

At trial, Glass Warehouse called Ms. Copeland, its sole witness, but she never testified about the company’s tax filings or return positions. She did not provide any evidence that Glass Warehouse had disclosed the relevant facts to Ahuja & Clark or that the CPA had provided any advice at all regarding the disallowed subcontractor expenses. The court found that the record was "devoid of any testimony or other evidence" showing that Glass Warehouse had sought or received advice from its preparer about the positions taken on the return. There was no evidence that Ahuja & Clark had analyzed the transactions, reviewed the underlying contracts, or opined on the deductibility of the payments.

The court emphasized that good-faith reliance on professional advice requires more than merely hiring a CPA. Citing Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 98 (2000), aff’d, 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002), the court explained that a taxpayer must show three things: (1) the adviser was a competent professional with sufficient expertise to justify reliance; (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser; and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser’s judgment. The court found that Glass Warehouse failed on all three prongs.

The court also rejected the argument that merely hiring a CPA insulated the corporation from penalties. The Treasury Regulations make clear that reliance on an information return or on the advice of a professional tax advisor does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1). The court quoted the regulation directly: "Reliance on an information return or on the advice of a professional tax advisor or an appraiser does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith." The court concluded that Glass Warehouse had not met its burden of proving reasonable cause or good faith, and therefore the $13,471 penalty under Section 6662(a) was sustained.

The ruling sends a clear message: oral assertions and informal CPA arrangements are insufficient when the IRS challenges a return position. The Tax Court’s strict enforcement of the taxpayer’s burden of proof for penalties demonstrates they are not an afterthought. To avoid penalties, taxpayers must document advice, disclose facts, and demonstrate actual reliance—the mere existence of a CPA’s signature does not create a safe harbor under Section 6662(a).

Key Takeaways for Closely Held Corporations

The Glass Warehouse ruling delivers three critical lessons for closely held corporations and their owners:

  1. Documentation is Non-Negotiable: The Tax Court enforced strict substantiation requirements under Section 6001, rejecting oral testimony or informal agreements as sufficient proof. Every subcontractor payment must be backed by written contracts, detailed invoices, and Forms 1099-NEC to avoid disallowance.

  2. Dual Compensation Structures Face Scrutiny: Mixing W-2 wages with subcontractor fees for the same shareholder-officer risks recharacterization as disguised dividends. Compensation must be internally consistent and externally defensible with clear business justification.

  3. Professional Advice Alone Does Not Shield Against Penalties: Reliance on a CPA is insufficient without documented evidence of disclosure, advice, and good-faith reliance. The court upheld a $13,471 penalty under Section 6662(a), reinforcing that penalties are a core component of tax compliance.

The ruling underscores the absolute necessity of contemporaneous, third-party documentation for deducting subcontractor expenses. The Tax Court held that invoices, contracts, and Forms 1099 are prerequisites for deductibility under Section 162, rejecting the petitioner’s lack of signed contracts, detailed invoices, or 1099 filings for $118,302 in subcontractor payments. Because Section 274(d) bars estimates for such expenses, the IRS’s position was non-negotiable, enforced by the court’s authority to disallow deductions entirely. For closely held corporations, this means every independent contractor payment must include a written agreement, detailed invoice, and filed Form 1099-NEC—or risk disallowance and recharacterization as a taxable dividend.

The decision highlights the perils of dual compensation structures, where W-2 wages are mixed with subcontractor fees for the same shareholder-officer. The IRS and court viewed this as a red flag for disguised dividends, recharacterizing poorly documented payments as non-deductible distributions. The lack of performance metrics, board resolutions, or industry benchmarks to justify the fees alongside W-2 wages was fatal. Aligning with the Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner (1999) test, the court examined industry standards, company performance, and the employee’s role. For closely held corporations, this means compensation structures must be internally consistent and externally defensible. If a shareholder-officer receives both W-2 wages and subcontractor fees, the corporation must document a clear business rationale—such as a temporary workload surge—or risk IRS recharacterization as dividends.

The third takeaway is the limits of flexibility in tax planning. The petitioner in Glass Warehouse argued that the subcontractor fees were justified by industry norms and prior practices, but the court rejected this contention outright. The opinion makes clear that a corporation cannot assume deductions will be allowed simply because it has historically taken them. The court’s holding—that substantiation trumps flexibility—is a direct rebuke to taxpayers who believe past practices or verbal agreements suffice. This is not a matter of interpretation; it is a statutory requirement enforced by the Tax Court’s authority to redetermine deficiencies. For closely held corporations, this means every expense must be supported by contemporaneous records at the time of payment. Waiting until an audit to scramble for documentation is a losing strategy, as the court’s decision demonstrates.

The fourth lesson is the penalty pitfalls for taxpayers who rely on professional advice without meeting the statutory requirements. The court’s affirmation of the 20% accuracy-related penalty under Section 6662(a) for a substantial understatement of income tax serves as a cautionary tale. The petitioner claimed reliance on a CPA, but the court found this insufficient to avoid penalties because the CPA’s advice was not documented, disclosed, or demonstrably followed. Section 6664(c) provides a defense for reasonable cause and good faith, but the court held that mere reliance on a professional’s signature on a return does not create a safe harbor. Taxpayers must document the advice received, disclose all relevant facts to their advisor, and demonstrate actual reliance—not just the existence of a CPA’s involvement. The court’s strict interpretation of this defense reinforces the IRS’s power to impose penalties even when a taxpayer employs a tax professional, shifting the burden back to the taxpayer to prove both the quality of the advice and the good faith in following it.

Finally, the decision signals potential for increased IRS scrutiny of compensation arrangements in closely held corporations. The court’s exercise of its authority to disallow deductions and uphold penalties—without deferring to the taxpayer’s arguments—suggests that the IRS will aggressively challenge dual compensation structures, subcontractor deductions, and shareholder-employee payments in future audits. The IRS’s 2023 compliance priorities, as outlined in IR-2023-123, explicitly target high-income taxpayers with substantial understatements, and compensation arrangements are a prime area for enforcement. For closely held corporations, this means proactive documentation and internal reviews are essential. The Tax Court’s ruling is not an isolated event; it is a blueprint for future IRS challenges. Corporations that fail to heed this warning risk not only unexpected tax liabilities but also penalties that compound the financial burden. The message is clear: in the eyes of the Tax Court, substantiation is not a formality—it is the foundation of tax compliance.

News summaries on this site are generated with the assistance of artificial intelligence from primary source documents and are provided for educational purposes only. They are not legal advice and may contain errors; consult a qualified tax attorney about your situation and rely on the original source document. Communications are not protected by attorney client privilege until such relationship with an attorney is formed.

Related Cases